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THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL MESS
Stephen L. Carter*
To many contemporary commentators, the doctrine of separation
of powers is a hoary non sequitur used to justify reactionary results.
To the evident frustration of the critics, however, the Supreme Court
has recently been quite solicitous of the original understanding on the
way in which federal power is to be distributed. In the face of a
chorus of calls for innovative legislative action to undo a supposed
government paralysis or to reverse a perceived concentration of au-
thority in the executive branch,1 the Supreme Court has generally
stuck to its guns, consistently reminding the Congress and the nation
that policy inconsistent with the structure of government mandated
by the Constitution is impermissible. So, for example, the Justices
made short work of the legislative veto2 and of the automatic budget
sequestration provisions of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. 3 The principle
of separation of powers, the Court explained in those cases, cannot
yield to claimed gains in efficiency, for the constitutional rule that is
subverted one day with the best intentions can just as easily be evaded
the next day with the worst.4
Against this background, many observers were surprised by the
Court's 7-I vote last Term in Morrison v. Olson,5 which sustained the
constitutionality of a key provision of the Ethics in Government Act.
6
* Professor of Law, Yale University. Some of the ideas in Parts I and IV of this comment
appeared earlier in Carter, Prosecutor Decision Troubling, Atlanta Journal and Constitution,
July 3, 1988, at r/E, col. I. I have had the benefit of comments from Enola Aird, Akhil Amar,
Lea Brilmayer, Abe Goldstein, Geoffrey Hazard, Michael McConnell, Peter Shane, Kate Stith,
and Ruth Wedgewood.
I For examples of the argument that the current model of separation of powers is itself
outmoded, see C. HARDIN, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY: TOWARD A NEW
CONSTITUTION (1974); Cutler, Political Parties and a Workable Government, in A WORKABLE
GOVERNMENT?: THE CONSTITUTION AFTER 200 YEARS 49 (B. Marshall ed. 1987); Cutler, To
Form a Government, in SEPARATION OF POWERS - DOES IT STILL WORK? I (R. Goldwin &
A. Kaufman eds. 1986); and Hardin, The Separation of Powers Needs Major Revision, in
SEPARATION OF POWERS - DOES IT STILL WORK?, cited above, at go. See also W. WILSON,
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 253-85 (1885) (arguing that the Congress has too much power
to check the executive branch).
2 See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
3 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
4 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958-59 ("[lit is crystal clear ... that the Framers ranked other
values higher than efficiency."); Synar, 478 U.S. at 722 (stating that separation of powers must
not be circumvented even though it "produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance").
s 108 S. Ct. 2597 (I988).
6 Title VI, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§
59r-598 (1982)).
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That statute, passed in the heady days after Richard Nixon was
toppled from office, permits judicial appointment of independent coun-
sels, popularly known as special prosecutors, to investigate allegations
of criminal wrongdoing in the executive branch, and, if necessary, to
prosecute the wrongdoers.
The proclamation that the Congress may assign the prosecution of
crime to an individual not under the control of any executive branch
official may be no more than a sop tossed to advocates of a stronger
Congress by a Supreme Court that has lately disdained their argu-
ments. If it is a sop, however, it is a highly interesting one. For the
method that the majority employed in Morrison is markedly different
from the ohe that the Justices have recently used to decide separation
of powers cases. To reach the result that they did, the Justices must
have found an original understanding dramatically different from
those they found in striking down other recent congressional assaults
on presidential prerogative; or they must have mistakenly thought
they had found one; or they must have not found one and not cared.
The first explanation is interesting if one wishes to debate consti-
tutional history, but not otherwise. The second explanation might
have some relevance in a discussion of the circumstances in which
judicial error implies illegitimacy. The third possibility, however,
ought to be enormously interesting to students of the separation of
powers. For even as the critics have called the search for an original
understanding on the structure of government a foolish one, the Court
until now has seemed to understand what the critics evidently have
not - that an originalist approach to questions about the structure
of government might represent the key to legitimacy of the judicial
function.
Consequently, if Morrison marks a move away from originalism
and toward deference to the Congress in the resolution of separation
of powers disputes, something important and in many ways troubling
is plainly in the wind. The other tantalizing possibility is that in
Morrison the originalist approach to separation of powers cases finally
and inevitably came into conflict with the Court's other structural
project, a project of longer standing: the legitimation and preservation
of the independent agencies. Thus, far from signalling a change in
direction, the decision to sustain the independent counsel provision of
the Ethics in Government Act might herald the Supreme Court's
resolution to stay the course as Court and Congress work together to
build an administrative, managerial government independent of effec-
tive executive control. If so, the decision arguably does no more than
maintain the status quo on the constitutionality of the independent
agencies. That status quo, however, has always been an uneasy one,
and if the Supreme Court, which has lately spent so much effort
championing the original understanding in separation of powers cases,
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ever applies its chosen analytical method to the burgeoning indepen-
dent administrative state, the results might be surprising.
I.
The independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act might best be understood by trying to play the game that some
hermeneutical approaches deny is possible - to imagine one's self
within the minds of the members of the post-Watergate Congress, an
enormously powerful institution, aided by the first elected post-Wa-
tergate President, Jimmy Carter, who had promised to give America
a government it could be proud of again. In 1978, when the Act was
adopted, Richard Nixon's resignation was but four years old, and his
Administration's efforts to sabotage both the electoral process and the
freedom to dissent were far from forgotten. On the contrary, in the
years after President Nixon was driven from office, the malfeasance
during his term assumed mythic proportions in the American political
imagination. The rhetoric of the hour insisted that the Republic itself
had ultimately been threatened by the conduct of the Nixon Admin-
istration - that, if not for a few hardy journalists and the President's
foolishness in taping his own conversations, the system might have
collapsed.
Faced with this folklore, the Congress girded itself somberly for
the battle to control executive authority. (Actually, the battle had
already been won: the system of balanced and separated powers had
worked, and the President, under threat of impeachment, had re-
signed. But never mind.) The Congress decreed that such a threat
to the survival of constitutional government must not occur again.
The best way to preserve constitutional government, the Congress
decided, was to protect it in the same way that threatened air and
water and wildlife and wilderness are protected: through what are in
essence regulatory statutes, although they regulate not electrical power
or financial power but executive power. Beginning in the last part of
the Nixon Administration, the Congress enacted a series of these
statutes, including the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the constitu-
tionality of which is still fiercely debated, 7 the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act amendments of 1974, much of which the Supreme Court
7 This debate has produced a wide range of opinions. Compare Rostow, "Once More Unto
the Breach:" The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 2i VAL. U.L. REv. 1, 5I (1986) (calling
the Resolution a "constitutional aberration") with Ides, Congress, Constitutional Responsibility,
and the War Power, I7 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 599, 631 (1984) ("Instead of fulfilling the intent of
the framers, the Resolution permits the President and Congress to continue to subvert that
intent."). See generally AMERICAN ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, WAR POWERS
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1984) (debate).
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subsequently struck down8 and the Presidential Recordings and Ma-
terials Preservation Act of 1974, which the Court sustained. 9
In 1978, evidently convinced that the abuses of Watergate would
have been reined in and punished far sooner had they been indepen-
dently investigated - not a bad hypothesis the Congress adopted
the Ethics in Government Act. Title VI of the Act requires the
Attorney General of the United States, in certain clearly defined cir-
cumstances, to apply to a judicial panel known as the Special Division
for the appointment of an independent counsel. 10 The Act provides
that the independent counsel, not the Attorney General, will be
charged with investigating and prosecuting violations of federal law
by executive branch employees. Because the statute tries to remove
from the Attorney General any discretion in the matter once the
statutory conditions are met, it is plainly designed to make the decision
whether to apply for appointment of an independent counsel an es-
sentially ministerial act. The Congress that passed the Act plainly
contemplated, moreover, that the independent counsel would under-
take her duties in the manner that the name implies - independently.
Hence, the counsel was to be independent of the President's control
and, a fortiori, independent of the Attorney General's control as well.
The premise of the Act is that the executive branch cannot be
trusted to investigate allegations of criminality by its own high offi-
cials. And it is certainly true, as supporters of the independent counsel
provision insist, that there always has been, and always will be,
malfeasance by employees of the executive branch. It is also true that
those with the power to do so always have been, and always will be,
tempted to limit the political damage that any investigation might
cause.
Under the approach to separation of powers questions that the
Court has followed in recent years, however, such policy concerns as
these are essentially irrelevant. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence
on separation of powers represents an admixture of two traditions.
The first might be called the evolutionary tradition, for it holds that
as the needs of the nation change over time, the Congress may guide
the evolution of fresh institutional forms to meet these changing needs.
8 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. i (1976).
9 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
10 The Act requires the Attorney General to investigate allegations "sufficient to constitute
grounds" for suspicion that officials covered by the Act may have "committed a violation of any
Federal criminal law" and to inform the Special Division of the results of the investigation. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 591(a), 592 (1982). If the Attorney General determines that there are "reasonable
grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted," id. § 592(c)(i), then
the Special Division "shall appoint an appropriate independent counsel and shall define that
independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction," id. § 593(b). The Special Division has no
authority to appoint an independent counsel if the Attorney General does not request one. See
id. § 592.
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The second might be called the de-evolutionary tradition, for it holds
that the constitutional scheme of balanced and separated powers
should be used as a brake on efforts to alter the form of government
that the Framers envisioned."
Over the past decade or so, a rather strict originalist form of the
de-evolutionary tradition has come to dominate the Court's separation
of powers jurisprudence. Relying heavily on James Madison's notes
of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 (a less than ideal source,
because they played no significant role in the debate over ratification
of the Constitution, the process that transformed the document into
fundamental law), 12 the Court has tried to measure the federal gov-
ernment's deployment of its powers against what it has determined
the views of the Founders to have been. So, for example, in rejecting
the legislative veto in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha,13 the Justices concluded that "[t]here is no support in the
Constitution" for the idea that the Congress or the President, for the
sake of efficiency, are free to avoid "the cumbersomeness and delays
often encountered in complying with explicit constitutional stan-
dards. "14 In Buckley v. Valeo,'5 which rejected provisions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act amendments permitting the Congress
itself to appoint some members of the Federal Election Commission,
the Justices dismissed the idea that fears of presidential manipulation
in the selection of those who ultimately would investigate allegations
of improprieties in the President's election campaign should be allowed
to alter the constitutional rules: "[S]uch fears, however rational, do
not by themselves warrant a distortion of the Framers' work.'
16
The common theme running through these and other de-evolution-
ary decisions is that, whatever disagreements might exist over the
appropriate interpretive method in other constitutional cases, there is
only one correct method when the structure of the federal government
is at issue: enforcing the Founders' shared vision of the way in which
I develop this model in detail in Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and
Subsequent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 722-60
[hereinafter Carter, Separation of Powers]. When I wrote that article in the autumn of 1986, I
was unaware that Geoffrey Miller was developing a similar paradigm. See Miller, Independent
Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 52-58 (contrasting "pragmatic" and "neoclassical" approaches
to separation of powers analysis). Although our analyses are quite different, we reach similar
conclusions: Professor Miller believes that the neoclassical approach is the more sensible, and I
believe the same of the de-evolutionary tradition. We also offer similar cautions. Compare id.
at 54 ("These two approaches are distinguishable principally in terms of emphasis and nuance.")
with Carter, supra, at 720 ("The important distinction between the traditions is one of empha-
sis.").
12 See infra note 21.
13 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
14 Id. at 959.
15 424 U.S. i (i976).
16 Id. at 134.
1988]
HeinOnline -- 102 Harv. L. Rev.  109 1988-1989
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
the federal government was to work. Claims of necessity, claims of
good policy, and claims of efficiency are not sufficient, under this
approach, to justify a new institutional form that runs afoul of the
system of balanced and separated powers that the Founders devised.
Consequently, careful readers of the Supreme Court's recent separation
of powers decisions would reasonably have expected the opinion in
Morrison v. Olson, whatever its conclusion, to reflect a painstaking
search through the notes of the Philadelphia Convention, the debates
over ratification, and other historical materials.
The Court, however, had a surprise in store. The surprise was
not that title VI was sustained, because, after all, without a study of
the history, it would not be easy to guess which way the history might
point. The surprise was that the majority opinion in Morrison, quite
unlike the Court's recent de-evolutionary analyses, treated the history
as virtually irrelevant, and in the end subordinated it to the very
policy concerns that earlier decisions had chosen to ignore. The in-
dependent counsel provision, the majority announced, is constitu-
tional, evidently because it does not transgress too far onto any specific
presidential power, and also because the Congress has determined that
independence is necessary to the prosecutor's functi6n. A little con-
stitutional language, no constitutional history, a dash of deference,
and the case is done. None of this necessarily makes the decision
wrong, but all of it makes the opinion startling.
The independent counsel provisions of title VI were challenged on
several grounds. First, the appointment of the independent counsel
by the Special Division was said to violate the appointment clause of
article 1,17 either because the counsel was a "principal" executive
officer whose appointment could not be delegated, or because execu-
tive officers could not in any case be appointed by the courts. Second,
the continuing supervision of the counsel by the Special Division was
said to violate the "case or controversy" requirement for judicial action
under article 111.18 Third, the cornerstone of the Act, the very inde-
pendence of the counsel from presidential control, was said to intrude
in a variety of ways on presidential prerogative, and, as a conse-
quence, to violate the separation of powers.
17 The appointment clause provides in relevant part:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint ... all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2.
18 The case or controversy requirement arises from the following language in article III: "The
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority
... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party .... I d. art. IMI, § 2, cl.
(VOL. 102:1o5
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The challenges to the method of appointment were hardly frivo-
lous, and Judge Silberman's majority opinion when the case was
before the District of Columbia Circuit found them compelling. 19
Given the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the appointment power,
however, the subjects of investigation who were the plaintiffs in Mor-
rison could not seriously have expected to prevail on them.20 In
assessing the appointment power claim, Chief Justice Rehnquist's ma-
jority opinion did discuss some of the history of the appointments
clause (not of article III), but considered only the third-best evidence
of the original understanding, Madison's secret notes of the Conven-
tion. 21 In the end, the Justices dismissed the assault on the appoint-
ment process in a passage as predictable as it was lengthy.
22
In rejecting the challenges to the supervisory authority of the
Special Division, the majority chose an easy (and, as will be seen,
troubling) way out. The Court construed the statute to deny the
Special Division any supervisory role over the counsel "in the exercise
of her investigative or prosecutorial authority. '23  The majority
reached this construction notwithstanding its admission that the Spe-
cial Division may select the counsel, define the counsel's jurisdiction,
alter that jurisdiction, refer additional matters to the counsel, decide
19 See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 481-87 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
20 The Court has read the appointment clause to vest the Congress with enormous discretion
in determining which branch or official will make appointments of "inferior" officers. See, e.g.,
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (holding that the Congress may
grant circuit courts the power to appoint United States commissioners); United States v. Eaton,
x69 U.S. 331 (1898) (holding that the Congress can confer power on the President to appoint
vice consul); Ex parte Siebold, oo U.S. 37, (i88o) (holding that the Congress enjoys discretion
to confer on one department the power to appoint officers with duties in another).
21 The best evidence of the original understanding is a comprehensive review of the political
science and practical concerns that motivated the Founders. See infra pp. 124-25. The second-
best evidence is a study of the ratification debates, including the pamphlets and newspapers
available to the public. (Note that The Federalist falls in the second category and is therefore
better evidence than Madison's notes.) On the unavailability of Madison's notes to the ratifiers,
see Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65
TEX. L. REv. 1, 2 (1986). On the significance of this unavailability to originalism, see Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 6o B.U.L. REv. 204, 214-17 (198o),
and Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 482-88 (i98i). Too heavy a
reliance on Madison's notes causes other problems as well. One recent study of Madison's notes
concluded that it is unlikely that he recorded more than a fraction of what was actually said.
See Hutson, supra, at 34. It is too often forgotten by present-day readers, moreover, that
Madison's notes were his private diaries, not the official minutes. He was under no obligation
to give a full sense of the deliberations of the Convention, and it makes no sense to assume
that he did so simply because his diaries have survived.
22 See io8 S. Ct. at 26o8-i6. The Court did not discuss the suggestion by the court of
appeals that the "inferior Officer" language is a staffing clause and refers to the appointment of
officers who are subordinate to the individual doing the appointing. See In re Sealed Case, 838
F.2d at 490-96. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Morrison, echoed the lower court's theme. See
io8 S. Ct. at 2631-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23 1o8 S. Ct. at 2613.
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what to do with the counsel's reports, and decide when the counsel's
task is "so substantially completed" that the counsel should be dis-
charged.24
The challenges to title VI on the ground that it interferes with
executive authority could not be so easily dismissed, and the argu-
ments that the majority selected suggest a considerable struggle to
find a way of evading them. Even as it sustained title VI, the Court
seemed to acknowledge by the very awkwardness of its arguments
that the constitutional difficulties raised by the independent counsel
provision are substantial. Chief among the problems is this: article II
vests the executive power in the President, and it was assumed on all
sides that the investigative and prosecutorial powers exercised by the
independent counsel are entirely executive in nature.25 If one who
indulges the de-evolutionary approach accepts that assumption, then
no matter who appoints the prosecutors there is at least a colorable
case to be made that the President is constitutionally entitled to control
them.2
6
But the President cannot supervise the independent counsel. In
fact, the Ethics in Government Act by its terms and its purpose creates
a class of prosecutors who, despite being granted the same investi-
gative and prosecutorial authority possessed by the Attorney General,
are not under the control of any elected official. 27 Nothing about the
Act could be plainer. For in spite of the Morrison majority's analytical
shenanigans that seem designed to raise doubt about who controls the
counsel, it is ultimately to the Special Division - the judicial panel
24 See id. at 2612-14.
25 Whether this should have been so readily conceded is another matter. See infra pp. 125-
27.
26 There is an important sense in which the President always retains an ultimate check on
federal prosecutors, because he has the apparently unreviewable discretion to issue pardons.
But for most federal officials charged with wrongdoing, a prison sentence or a formal record of
conviction will be only a very small part of the problem of being prosecuted. There is the
public disgrace, the emotional energy that is spent in worry, in defense, and perhaps even in
contrition, and there is the permanent blot - whether formal or not - on one's reputation.
None of these are cured by a pardon. A pardon prior to prosecution might make matters worse,
should the public assume that the official would never have accepted a pardon in the absence
of something to hide. Consequently, the President might argue that because he is forced to use
it as the only means for controlling the prosecutor, the independent counsel provision raises the
political cost of exercising the pardon power and therefore burdens that power impermissibly.
But a Court unprepared to hold unconstitutional the direct burden that title VI places on an
implied but conceded power could hardly be expected to hold unconstitutional the indirect
burden that it might conceivably place on an enumerated power.
27 For Alexander Bickel, considering the matter at the height of the controversy over Pres-
ident Nixon's dismissal of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, this was the basic argument against
an independent special prosecutor: "I think the real problem is that if you try to set him up
independently by judicial appointment he is answerable to no one. He is not responsible to
anyone within the whole scheme of American government." Bickel, Alexander M. Bickel on the
Special Prosecutor, Yale L. Rep., Winter 1974, at 24.
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that makes the appointment - and not to the Attorney General or to
any other executive functionary that the independent counsel answers,
if, indeed, the counsel answers to anyone. It is difficult to accept that
the Justices were unable to grasp this, for a moment's thought will
reveal that no other view makes sense: the Congress would hardly go
to all the trouble of setting up the independent counsel mechanism if
the individual occupying the office is to be considered just another
executive appointee in the chain of command that ultimately reaches
the President. And there is some experience to support this proposi-
tion. The special panel that appoints the independent counsels has
frequently issued orders to them, but the Attorney General has never
dared try.
28
In Morrison, however, the Justices seemed unwilling to concede
that the Attorney General - and therefore the President - lacks all
effective ability to control the independent counsel. The Act, the
majority explained, merely "reduces the amount of control or super-
vision" that the President and the Attorney General may exercise.
29
As evidence of the President's continuing supervisory authority, the
Court pointed out that the independent counsel may be removed for
good cause and that no judicial review is available of the Attorney
General's decision to decline to ask the Special Division for appoint-
ment in the first place.
30
This argument is in some tension with earlier separation of powers
cases suggesting that the ability of the Congress to limit the President's
removal power to "good cause" situations was a legislative check on
executive discretion, not an affirmative grant of authority to the Pres-
ident.3 ' The general understanding of those cases has long been that
they meant what they said - that the Congress had the authority to
limit presidential power to remove officials in agencies constituted
outside the executive branch. 32 Consequently, the Morrison majority
28 For a discussion of the orders issued to independent counsels by the Special Division, see
In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 513-14 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The Morrison majority strongly
suggests that orders on such matters as exemption from conflict of interest rules are beyond the
statutory mandate, and perhaps beyond the limits of the judicial power, because they involve
neither an appointment nor the resolution of a case or controversy. See io S. Ct. at 2615.
Even if the Special Division cannot issue orders to the independent counsel, however, it is
somewhat disingenuous for the Court to suggest that the President can control the independent
counsel through his ability to ensure that she performs her statutory duty. One need only
imagine the political firestorm that would follow the receipt of a letter from the President to
the independent counsel threatening dismissal unless she ceases her investigation into area X
which, the President says, is not covered by her mandate or is beyond her statutory duty.
29 See 08 S. Ct. at 2621.
30 See id. at 2621.
31 See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
32 See, e.g., Miller, supra note ii, at 90-96; Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About
Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 430, 460-64 (1987); Strauss,
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faced the need to explain how a prosecutor - assumed on all sides
to be within the executive branch - could nevertheless be exempt
from removal by the President. In response to the logical claim that
the Congress may not interfere with the President's control over his
subordinates in carrying out "core executive functions," the majority
offered the following analysis:
[O]ur present considered view is that the determination of whether
the Constitution allows Congress to impose a "good cause"-type re-
striction on the President's power to remove an official cannot be
made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as "purely
executive." The analysis contained in our removal cases is designed
not to define rigid categories of those officials who may or may not
be removed at will by the President, but to ensure that Congress does
not interfere with the President's exercise of the "executive power" and
his constitutionally appointed duty to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed" under Article II.
33
The Justices added:
We do not mean to suggest that an analysis of the functions served
by the officials at issue is irrelevant. But the real question is whether
the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the
President's ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the functions
of the officials in question must be analyzed in that light. 34
True to their words, the Justices proceeded to analyze the functions
of the independent counsel and concluded that "because the indepen-
dent counsel may be terminated for 'good cause,' the Executive,
through the Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that
the counsel is competently performing her statutory responsibilities in
a manner that comports with the provisions of the Act."35 Conse-
quently, the opinion concluded, the removal restriction does not "suf-
ficiently deprive[ the President of control over the independent counsel
to interfere impermissibly with his constitutional obligation to ensure
the faithful execution of the laws."'36
The only sensible construction that can be placed upon this bizarre
argument is that the President's supervisory responsibilities over sub-
ordinate executive branch employees arise not from the clause of
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM.
L. REv. 573, 6og-i6 (1984).
33 io8 S. Ct. at 2618 (citation omitted).
34 Id. at 2619.
3S Id.
36 Id. at 2620.
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article TH vesting the executive power in the President37 - the obvious
place to look for it - but from the clause stating that the President
"shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. s38 Whether one
believes that the "take care" clause was intended as a limitation of
executive authority or as a grant, this much of the argument is at
least plausible. But because the test of presidential control is whether
the President is able to ensure that the counsel is performing "com-
petently" and "in a manner that comports with the provisions of the
Act," the Court must be conceiving the President's supervisory au-
thority under the "take care" clause as purely ministerial in nature.
Thus, the only constitutional "control" that the President is able to
exercise free from congressional restraint is the control that the Con-
gress is least likely to restrain: taking care that all executive employees
are doing what the Congress requires of them. 39
A rule of that nature wreaks havoc upon the system of checks and
balances inherent in the separation of powers. 40 The President loses
the traditional executive discretion in the execution of law, which has
included the discretion not to enforce the law if, in the executive's
judgment, the law is unjust or oppressive, either in general or in a
particular case. 41 The President loses the independent will that the
37 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § i ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America."). As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in Morrison, see o8
S. Ct. at 2623 (Scalia, J., dissenting), the executive power is granted in terms far less equivocal
than those of the article I grant of legislative power, which reads: "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § I.
Among the many ways of accounting for this discrepancy is the conclusion that the phrase
"executive power," unlike the phrase "legislative power," is meant to subsume implied as well
as express authority.
38 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
39 This is not to deny the general proposition that executive employees are bound to follow
the law. The question, rather, is whether presidential authority over them can be limited to
supervising their performance of a set of congressionally mandated ministerial duties.
40 As M.J.C. Vile has pointed out, the doctrines of a "pure" separation of powers and of a
system of checks and balances "are not merely logically distinct, but to a considerable extent
they conflict with each other." M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS 33 (1967); see also G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 119
(I981) (concluding that the notions are "at odds" with one another). It is possible, however, to
develop an admixture of separation of powers and checks and balances - what I call the system
of balanced and separated powers - and this is what the Founders did when designing the
structure of the federal government. See Carter, Separation of Powers, supra note ii, at 77,-
78.
41 The rule is well established in American constitutional jurisprudence that, absent a vio-
lation of an independent constitutional right, the executive holds the unreviewable authority to
decide whether to prosecute. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (i985); Borden-
kircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1869);
cf. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) (suggesting
that neither judge nor grand jury can force the government to prosecute or even to sign an
indictment). The courts have interpreted the arguably mandatory language of the Ethics in
Government Act itself to preserve a scintilla of this discretion: the Attorney General's discretion
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Founders had in mind when they called for an executive with greater
energy.42 Instead, the President is reduced to a sort of minion of the
Congress, an elected auditor whose task is to fire those employees
who fail to carry out their duties in the way that the Congress com-
mands.
The most surprising aspect of the Morrison decision is not, how-
ever, the Court's conclusion on the nature of presidential authority,
but the fact that the conclusion was reached without significant ref-
erence to the original understanding that has guided so many impor-
tant separation of powers decisions in recent years. The reason that
the Justices chose not to debate the history cannot be that the records
are thin, because they are voluminous, and their significance is the
subject of lively debate. 43 Unfortunately, without the guidance of that
history, there is no way (at least, no de-evolutionary way) of assessing
the propriety of the majority's implicit disdain for the claims that the
President's duties include supervising every employee of the executive
branch, and that the supervisory function is frustrated if an employee
cannot be dismissed for disobeying the President's command - claims
that form the basis of the argument that the counsel's independence
violates the separation of powers.
What, then, can one make of the analysis in Morrison? One
possibility is that the Justices have simply abandoned the de-evolu-
tionary tradition in separation of powers jurisprudence, and have
decided to allow congressional judgments about necessity to dominate
the Founders' vision. Yet so extraordinary a development would
surely find hints and precursors in other recent opinions, and there
simply are none to be found.
If, however, the majority's approach in Morrison stands in the de-
evolutionary tradition of recent years, then it is de-evolutionary anal-
ysis of a peculiar sort, because Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion gave
no sense of appreciating the flavor of the Constitution as a whole, the
political science of the Founding Era, or the rich and dynamic inter-
play of one section of the document with another. So unimaginative
an approach poses the risk that Morrison might be read to enshrine
not to seek a prosecutor or not to investigate a charge against an executive official in the first
place has been held not subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817
(9th Cir. 1986); Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court in
Morrison cited this unreviewable discretion not to appoint as evidence that the President can
"control" the independent counsel, see io8 S. Ct. at 2621, but the problem is that once the
appointment is made, the executive branch has no further say in the counsel's performance of
her quintessentially executive function.
42 See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at io-x6 (5th ed.
1984); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 549-53 (1969).
43 For discussions of the original understanding on the authority to remove executive officials,
see, for example, L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS: CONGRESS, THE PRES-
IDENT, AND THE LAW 50-56 (1978), and Miller, cited above in note ii, at 67-71.
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as the law of the land Charles Black's fanciful rumination that the
plain text of the Constitution sets out only four or five significant
presidential powers: the power (or duty) to receive ambassadors, the
power (or duty) to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, the
commander-in-chief power, the veto power, and the pardoning
power.44 And to a Congress minded to limit them, Professor Black
suggests, the commander-in-chief power and the veto power are not
particularly important.45 Thus, he concludes, "[o]n paper, and as a
matter of irreducible minimum, the presidency is an office of'very
little uncontrollable power."46 The Congress, on the other hand, has
in its power "just about everything.
'47
The Chief Executive described by Professor Black is effectively a
creature of the Congress, rather than a representative of the states (or
the people) meant to balance what might otherwise be a runaway
legislature. So hapless a President is certainly not what the American
political system has come to expect, and so weak an office does not
bear much resemblance to what the Founders thought that they were
creating. Yet it seems a perfectly sensible way of reading Morrison
to conclude that the Congress has the authority to reduce the President
to precisely that, through the simple device of making presidential
"subordinates" independent of presidential control.
That reading of Morrison may not be quite what the Justices had
in mind. The Court may have supposed that it was preserving a
strong executive in the general case, but that the President's prerog-
ative had to yield in this specific matter, because the Congress had
determined that independence of the counsel was vital to the operation
of the Ethics in Government Act. If this was what the Justices had
in mind, then although the opinion might have been poorly drafted,
it stands in an established constitutional tradition. The trouble is that
it is a tradition that may rest on sand. This tradition holds that when
the Congress decides that independence is necessary for an agency to
do its job, even a job partly executive, it may insulate the agency
from presidential control. This is the tradition that undergirds the
modern administrative state, but it has never been adequately justified
by the Court as a matter of constitutional law. In a constitutional
world in which the Justices understand the link between legitimacy
and originalism in separation of powers disputes, a constitutional
reexamination of the tradition of independent administrative govern-
ment is long overdue. Before sketching the outline of such a reex-
amination, however, it is useful to pause and consider a bit of theory.
44 See Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, I HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 13, 14-I5 (1974).
45 See id.
46 Id. at 20.
47 Id. at i5.
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Morrison v. Olson is a paradoxical decision only to the enthusiast
of the de-evolutionary originalism that has dominated the Supreme
Court's recent separation of powers jurisprudence. The curious aspect
of originalism, however, is that its principal enthusiasts are the Jus-
tices themselves. Among constitutional theorists, originalism holds
roughly the status of Lysenkoism among geneticists: a silly idea no
longer worth the energy required to refute it. Besides, volumes and
volumes have already been written about the impracticality, impos-
sibility, or immorality of originalism in most of its forms. 48
As Philip Soper has pointed out, however, "[c]ountless judicial
opinions line the shelves of countless professional libraries mutely
attesting to the irrelevance of legal theory by their utter disregard for
this body of scholarship. '49 Thus it should not be particularly sur-
prising that the Justices of the Supreme Court seem blissfully unaware
of, or perhaps merely unimpressed by, the stinging and often cogent
criticisms of originalism in its various guises. True, the critics dismiss
what the Justices are doing as reactionary, pointless, or simply crazy,
but there may be method to the Court's apparent madness. It is
worth taking a moment to consider whether there might be a sensible
theoretical reason for the Justices to cling to their much-maligned
vision of the way constitutional interpretation ought to take place,
because, if there is, then Morrison's method might turn out to be as
troubling as it is startling.
Consider, first, the possibility that we have a multitude of Consti-
tutions, for the Constitution of the United States is many documents,
and not all of these documents serve the same purpose. One of the
many lines along which the Constitution might be sliced is this one:
some clauses relate to rights of individuals within the system of gov-
ernment, and others relate to the structure of the system itself. The
individual rights clauses are usually written in the glowing and evoc-
ative terms of moral appeal, and, taken together, might be called our
Natural Law Constitution. The structural clauses, which constitute
what might be called our Political Constitution, are relatively dry and
relatively concrete. The individual rights clauses, when considered as
ordinary language, seem to deny by their very words the possibility
that they have very specific referents. The structural clauses, on the
other hand, carry with them the suggestion that the authors had in
mind a very specific vision of the system under construction.50
48 See, e.g., M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE 21-45 (1988); Brest, supra note 21;
Dworkin, supra note 2z; Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA.
L. REV. 1237 (1986).
49 P. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 2 (1984).
SO 1 make no claim that the structural clauses are determinate in the sense that they require
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It is a mistake to assume that the Political Constitution and the
Natural Rights Constitution, with their different emphases and dif-
ferent forms of language, ought necessarily to be subjected to the same
rules for interpretation.5 ' Every act of interpretation is an act under-
taken for a specific purpose, and the purpose of the interpretation
generates the question that the interpreter ought to ask. The error of
conflating interpretation under the Political and Natural Law Consti-
tutions arises from the assumption that the interpretations share a
common purpose, usually captured in the word "adjudication." But
although it is true that the happenstance of adjudication occasions
judicial interpretation, it is not correct to call adjudication the pur-
pose. To do so takes too narrow a view of the role that the Founding
Generation and the Constitution itself play in American political icon-
ography.
Constitutional interpretation is (or ought to be) a narrative activity.
When the courts announce what the Constitution means, they are
doing more than adjudicating; they are adding chapters to a story,
not entirely of their own making, of the American people and their
place in history. For the Constitution, at its heart, is not a document
but a continuing saga - the saga of We, the People of the United
States, in whose name the document speaks. The story provides us
with continuity, by linking our world to the world that has gone
before; and it provides us with immortality, by linking our world to
the world that is yet to come. It is not a story told by the judges
alone, or by the historians, or by the politicians; it is also a consti-
tutional story that we - We, the People - tell about ourselves.
5 2
The recent battle over the nomination of Robert Bork to the
Supreme Court suggests a widespread public cynicism about adjudi-
cation under the Natural Rights Constitution. The public sense seems
to be that individual rights are more or less historical accidents,
controlled entirely by the biases of the people who happen to sit as
Justices at a given moment in time - a sense that helps to explain
the proprietary interest people take in the particular balance of votes
no interpretation. I have argued previously (evidently to little effect) that the task of a judge
concerned about the legitimacy of the judicial function is to try to render the structural clauses
relatively determinate, in order to create a constitutional "safe harbor" in which all three branches
can experiment and try new policies. See Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeter-
minate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 864 (x985);
Carter, The Right Questions in the Creation of Constitutional Meaning, 66 B.U.L. REv. 71, 76
(1986); Carter, Separation of Powers, supra note ix, at 785-91.
51 But cf. J. ELY, DFmOCRACY AND DISTRUST 41 n.* (xg8o) (arguing that "the Constitution
is not divided into two sets of provisions, precise and open-ended"); Brest, supra note 21, at
237 n.124 (making a similar argument).
S2 For a similar evocation of the theme of narrative continuity, see S. LEVINSON, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL FAITH (1988). For a fascinating discussion of the role of history and tradition in a
society's evolution and stability, see J. PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION (1984).
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that a new appointment might bring.53 In the face of this public
cynicism, and of the invitation evident in the words of the Natural
Law Constitution, it is not easy to propose with confidence a "best"
interpretive rule, and those who do - and there are many - do so
at considerable intellectual and political peril.
What the Supreme Court apparently recognizes in its separation
of powers jurisprudence, however, is that adjudication under the
Political Constitution requires more concrete rules for interpretation
to match the Political Constitution's quite different status. The Polit-
ical Constitution, which is basically the work of the Founding Gen-
eration, plays a central role in our political iconography, because that
is where the myths are. Many years ago, Mad Magazine satirized
Disneyland's Frontierland as embodying "true tales made up from the
legendary past" - which is as good a definition as there is of popular
history, and ,as good a description as there is of the popular attitude
toward the Founders.
In American political iconography, the Founders are the larger-
than-life figures who cast off the shackles of taxation without repre-
sentation and founded the most successful and stable and just gov-
ernment that the world has ever known. The link between the gov-
ernment that they founded and the one that we have provides us with
a continuity in nationhood that places us - We, the People - within
the great sweep of the nation's history. We are the same We, the
People, who ordained the Constitution, and we live in the same nation
that the Founders created precisely because we retain the form of
government that they gave us: "They were the Founders who laid
down the rules; we are the inheritors who follow the rules that the
Founders laid down."5
4
If there really is in the American political system any functional
equivalent of the consent of the governed, whether actual or tacit,
then surely it arises from the role that our myths about the Founding
play in the popular attitude about American government. If political
obligation is willed at all, it is surely willed against the background
of that mythology. In our political iconography, as Sanford Levinson
has pointed out, the Philadelphia Convention "is most certainly, and
profoundly, an event in addition to a text."55 Whether treated as text
or event, however, "'Philadelphia' itself gains meaning only from being
placed within a narrative structure, itself of civil religious dimen-
sion."56 The public may not know what is in the Constitution, and
in a sense may not even care, but the people evidently believe that
53 See Carter, The Confirmation Mess, ioi HARv. L. REV. 1x85, 1189-95 (1988).
54 Carter, Separation of Powers, supra note II, at 792. I discuss this model of public regard
in more detail in S. Carter, The Republical Vision of the Demos (work in progress).
ss S. LEVINSON, supra note 52, at 134.
56 Id.
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their government, the Republic to which schoolchildren pledge daily
allegiance, is in its fundamental structure the one that the Founders
designed. It matters little whether the people are right or wrong to
assume that the structure of our government has been handed on to
us by past generations substantially continuous with our own; it mat-
ters still less whether historians or legal scholars or judges think that
they know better; for the beginning of legitimacy is the ruler's rec-
ognition that the people need not be smart in order to matter.
A judge who is concerned about the legitimacy of the government,
and about the legitimacy of the judicial function, which is prescribed
in the same Political Constitution that establishes the other branches,
will obviously be cautious in permitting the evolution of new institu-
tional forms not contemplated in the system of checks and balances
that the Founders set forth. If the judge accepts the notion that much
of the public respect for government and for law rests on the suppo-
sition that the government operates in accordance with the rules
handed down by the Founding Generation, it would be logical for her
to decide that the government must play by the rules under which
the public supposes that the game is played.5 7 Otherwise - so the
judge might reason - a massive and unjust fraud is being perpetrated
on the citizenry. Indeed, although popular uprising over constitutional
interpretation is not a prospect, the judge who understands the pop-
ular vision might seriously consider whether such a fraud puts the
legitimacy of the government in hazard. If the rules of the game are
not the ones devised by the Founders, then there really may be no
practical sense in which the federal government, in all its institutional
complexity, enjoys the consent of the governed.58 Thus the judge
could sensibly conclude that the ideal theory of interpretation is one
that encourages the search for the vision shared by the Founders on
the fundamental rules that would control the structure of the govern-
ment.
This reasoning might explain how the Justices could end up where
they were before Morrison: insisting on a form of originalism in cases
arising under the Political Constitution, and applying other interpre-
tive rules, sometimes radically inconsistent ones, in cases arising under
the Natural Rights Constitution. The Justices might well believe that
originalism in structural cases is the key to legitimacy - including
57 The governnment that must play by the structural rules includes the judicial branch
because, as Chief Justice Marshall reminded, the Founders designed the Constitution "as a rule
for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i
Cranch) 137, 18o (1803). Even the most dedicated anti-originalists generally base their "proofs"
of judicial review on textual and originalist arguments, that is, on the de-evolutionary tradition.
S8 But cf. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REv. x, 37-39 (1979) (using tacit consent theory to justify judicial review of govern-
ment institutions as well as policies).
1988]
HeinOnline -- 102 Harv. L. Rev.  121 1988-1989
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
the legitimacy of the judicial freedom to exercise greater discretion in
interpretation of the Natural Law Constitution. The originalist pro-
ject of rendering the Political Constitution relatively concrete might
then be viewed as a pragmatic choice as well as one dictated by
theory. Nevertheless, if the Court has indeed embarked on such a
project (Morrison notwithstanding), it is obviously important to con-
sider the limitations of the method.
The choice to pursue and enforce the original understanding priv-
ileges one set of values over another; there is nothing "objective" about
the selection.5 9 Nor can originalism do all that some of its most ardent
advocates may pretend. In fact, intentionalism - the form of origi-
nalism that asks what the original authors intended to accomplish -
has been shown to be very nearly impossible. The intentionalist,
looking at Morrison, would want to know precisely what rule the
authors of the Constitution thought they were embodying on the
subject of presidential control of executive department employees -
or, better yet, of prosecutors. But that question may have no sensible
answer. Consider the arguments arrayed against intentionalism in
interpreting the 1787 Constitution: an observer in our age is not
capable of entering the mind of an actor in an earlier age and, as a
consequence, cannot possibly tell what was in the earlier actor's
mind;60 or, if it is possible to tell what was in the actor's mind, we
emphasize the wrong source, Madison's secret diary of the Conven-
tion, even though the Constitution gained its force of law from rati-
fication, not drafting, and Madison's notes were unavailable to the
ratifiers;61 or, if we use the records of the ratification debates, we find
them generally obscure;62 or, if not obscure, the records of the rati-
fication debates are unreliable; 63 or, if reliable, the records suggest
that the Founders themselves did not consider intentionalism to be
the proper method of interpretation; 64 or, if the Founders did think
59 Objectivity in constitutional interpretation is not a fact but a hope, an effort to discipline
the interpretive act by providing a standard against which the interpretation can be measured.
See Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 445 (1984); Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. RFv. 739 (x982) [hereinafter Fiss, Objectivity and Interpreta-
tion]. A rule can constrain interpretation, in the sense of providing a standard for measurement,
as long as the rule is relatively clear and is applied within a community sharing conversational
assumptions. The rule "do what the Founders said to do" is therefore no more objective in the
sense of providing constraint than the rule "do what redistributes the greatest wealth." Each is
capable of reasonably dispassionate application by a judge who acts in good faith. See Carter,
Separation of Powers, supra note ii, at 781-82. Consequently, the choice among possible rules
must be based on something other than the claim that one of them produces "objective" results.
60 See Brest, supra note 21, at 218-22; Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659,
668-78 (1987).
61 See supra note 2I.
62 See Powell, supra note 6o, at 688-91.
63 See Hutson, supra note 21, at 13-24; Powell, supra note 6o, at 681-82.
64 See Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of "This
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intentionalism to be the proper method, the tools of public choice
theory show that they did not construct their votes in a way that
revealed their intentions. 6
5
Intentionalism, moreover, reflects the well-known trap of scien-
tism. 66 Intentionalists hope to describe history with the sort of cer-
tainty that natural scientists bring to the task of describing the physical
world. The effort to make historical materials do what they are not
capable of doing leads to the presentation of some very poor history
as originalist argument. 67 The fact that the Supreme Court sometimes
seems to seek intentionalist answers has led any number of scholars
into the equally well-known trap of "law office history" - of stating
highly specific historical conclusions on the basis of sketchy and im-
precise historical evidence. 68 Many very fine thinkers have stumbled
into this trap, thereby running afoul of one of the best of H. Jefferson
Powell's "rules for originalists": "Consensus or even broad agreement
among the founders is a historical assertion to be justified, not as-
sumed. "69
Constitution," 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1186-220 (1987) (arguing that originalism was only one
of many interpretive strategies considered legitimate by the Founders); Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (z985) (arguing that originalism was
not the interpretive strategy favored by the Founders).
65 William Piker, for example, has argued that because of the existence of voting cycles, the
Convention's decision on how the President would be selected does not necessarily reflect the
true preferences of the delegates. See iker, The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The
Presidency in z787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice, 78 AM. POL. ScI.
REV. I (x984).
66 Cf. L. TRILLING, The Sense of the Past, in THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION 176, 178-79
(1976) (objecting to efforts to make literary criticism reflect "the certainty of science"); McCloskey,
The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REv. 752, 764 (1988) (suggesting that scientism
has special appeal because "[tihe rhetoric of the scientific paper since Newton has said 'I am a
scientist: give way."').
67 See Nelson, supra note 48, at 1246-49. I will confess that I have fallen into this trap
myself. See Carter, The Political Aspects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential
Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1341, 1357-63 (1983).
68 The phrase "law office history" was coined by Alfred H. Kelly. See Kelly, Clio and the
Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 119, i22.
69 Powell, supra note 6o, at 684; cf. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 102 (1962) ("[To seek in historical materials relevant
to the framing of the Constitution, or in the language of the Constitution itself, specific answers
to specific present problems is to ask the wrong questions.").
A good example of this error is the prevailing wisdom among many writers on the war
power that the Founders, when they decided at Philadelphia to bestow on the Congress the
power to "declare" war rather than the power to "make" it, did so solely and simply in order
to leave the President free to respond to "sudden attacks." Some very accomplished scholars
have read the history this way. See, e.g., L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 82 (1988);
R. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
17 (1983). The conclusion rests entirely on the following sentence from Madison's notes: "Mr.
M[adison] and Mr. Gerry moved to insert 'declare,' striking out 'make' war; leaving to the
Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
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Similarly, a Supreme Court interested in discerning the original
understanding on separation of powers issues would make a grave
error (and perhaps has occasionally made one) by insisting in an
intentionalist way on evidence of what the Founders thought the
answer was. There is more to originalism than intentionalism. Orig-
inalism means many things to many people, and this is not the place
to catalogue all the possibilities. 70 Suffice it to say that the de-evo-
lutionary project of using originalism as a tool of legitimacy requires
more historical evidence than often satisfies the intentionalist, but at
the same time requires considerably less certainty and precision. The
task is to ensure that the fundamental value choices made by the
Founders in devising the system of balanced and separated power
continue to guide the structure of the federal government. Thus the
de-evolutionary project requires an answer not to the question "Did
the Founders intend that the President control all executive officers
or not?" but to the quite different question "Is independence of this
kind consistent with the values underlying the scheme of balanced
and separated powers or not?" If the second question accurately
captures what the Justices have been doing, then they may have
discovered something important.
71
Although this de-evolutionary project, like all'efforts at reading
history, possesses certain obvious limitations, it avoids many of the
OF 1787, at 318 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). According to Madison's notes, the motion to substitute
"declare" for "make" passed by a vote of seven to two, a vote that then became eight to one
after Rufus King convinced Oliver Ellsworth to switch his vote by arguing that "'make' war
might be understood to 'conduct' it which was an Executive function." Id. at 319 n.*.
But the Convention's official secretary, William Jackson, whose notes are generally much
thinner than Madison's, has quite a different account of the debate. According to Jackson, the
motion initially failed by a vote of five to four and passed only after King's remarks. See W.
REVELEY, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 83-84 (1981); Lofgren, War-Making
Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 8x YALE L.J. 672, 675-77 (1972). If
Jackson is right, and if originalist history really can be done on the basis of a few scribbled
words, then the "reason" the convention voted to change "make" to "declare" had nothing to do
with sudden attacks and a great deal to do with restricting congressional involvement in
warmaking. The better answer, obviously, is to term the records of the Convention obscure on
this point, and perhaps even to admit the error of using the records of the Convention in the
first place. The interpreter is then free to try to uncover a richer, more widely shared original
understanding through a thorough study of the records of the state conventions and other
documentary materials pertaining to the controversy over ratification.
70 For one effort at a catalogue, see Brest, cited above in note 21, at 205-24.
71 Even if this is their project, the Justices may not always perform it successfully. I have
argued elsewhere that a judge who is uncertain about the fundamental value choices of the
Founders ought to invoke the political question doctrine, leaving the political branches to fight
over the matter. See Carter, Separation of Powers, supra note iI, at 8oo-o8. But see Goldwater
v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 999 (i979) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the mere difficulty of
applying interpretive rules does not make a question political). The judicial task, in any case,
is to strive, not to win. The judicial process is justified by the good faith effort of the judge,
and is not undermined by the possibility of an erroneous interpretation. See Fiss, Objectivity
and Interpretation, supra note 59, at 749.
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pitfalls that have snared other originalist efforts. 72 The judge is
searching only for those aspects of constitutional history that provide
the continuity linking the nation in which we live with the one that
the Founders envisioned, and that is a task that requires only that
the judge identify those aspects of the system that were originally
understood as fundamental to the transformation of political science
into political practice. Implementing this project means avoiding the
mistakes of the many "law office" originalists who confine themselves
to the records of deliberations on concise constitutional clauses rather
than immersing themselves in the intellectual currents of the Founding
Generation, a far richer path toward identifying the fundamental
postulates standing behind particular provisions of the Constitution. 73
This might or might not be what the Justices are actually up to,
but, if it is, it is no easy theory for them to sell. In the post-liberal
legal world, law is policy, not structure. Advocates of particular
devices and institutions for the efficient deployment of government
authority to attain particular ends have little patience with de-evolu-
tionary review. 74 They would prefer a world in which, as long as
individual rights are protected, the government may reconstitute itself
in a fresh image, one in which all that matters in selecting the proper
legal rule to govern the society's transformation is an appreciation of
the learning of the policy scientists. This world would be one in
which the only important test is whether the new institutional form
will work. The Founders might have imagined that, in crafting the
system of balanced and separated powers, they were constructing a
bulwark against tyranny, but in today's policy-analytic world, the
critics know better. Efficiency, not liberty, is their goal.
It is not possible to show that the critics are wrong; it is only
possible to suggest that the project in which the Justices are engaged
contemplates legitimacy in another form. The de-evolutionary project
links legitimacy to the political iconography that provides the sense
72 The approach may also avoid some of the moral dilemmas that lead so many theorists to
bristle at the word "originalism." For example, although the judge might study the history to
learn many things about the original understanding of the place of the President in the structure
of government, it is not relevant whether the Founders expected that people other than white
males would ever hold the office. But see Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions Get Wrong Answers:
An Analysis of Professor Carter's Approach to Judicial Review, 66 B.U.L. REV. 47, 56 (1986)
(raising this challenge to originalists).
73 Discerning the Federalist political science is not always easy, but the effort to do so has
led to some splendid writing. See, e.g., F. McDoNALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTEL-
LECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (i985); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); G.
WOOD, supra note 42.
74 See, e.g., Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and
the Legislative Veto, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 125; Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, I J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 81 (1985); Sargentich, supra
note 32; Strauss, supra note 32.
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of continuity in nationhood that makes the American people into a
People. The de-evolutionary project tries to give people the govern-
ment that they already think they have, by preserving the basic
structure that the Founders designed. The project, in short, tries to
treat the Founders as the larger-than-life figures that the popular
imagination insists that they are. Their fundamental structural choices
must be respected and there can be no tampering with their handi-
work. If this be ancestor worship, then the Justices are apparently
prepared to make the most of it.75
And this is where the Justices could have, and perhaps should
have, made their stand in Morrison. The majority could have gone
to the history of ratification and the political science of the Founding
Era, could have delved and burrowed and studied and filled the
opinion with whatever it discovered. Quite conceivably, the Court
would have reached the same result. The Justices might have noted,
for example, that in England, as late as the eighteenth century, crim-
inal prosecution was still something instigated by private individuals,
and although the Attorney General brought some cases and could
defeat a private prosecution by filing a writ of nolle prosequi, the
system was essentially private. 76 A dual system of public and private
prosecution, together with some appointments of prosecutors by the
courts, was the practice in most of the colonies at the time of the
Founding. 77 In the first decades of the Republic, federal prosecutors
- then known as district attorneys - bore a somewhat ambiguous
relationship to the executive branch. They were appointed by the
President, but had no direct superior in the federal government, and
they acted with considerable independence, often as aides to the fed-
eral courts and the judicially controlled grand juries. 78 Such historical
75 I discuss the ancestor worship analogy in Carter, Separation of Powers, cited above in
note ii, at 738-39, and defend it in S. Carter, The Republical Vision of the Demos, cited above
in note 54. See also S. LEVINSON, supra note 52.
76 See J. EDWARDS, THE LAW OFFICERS OF THE CROWN (1964); S. MILSON, HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 403-21 (2d ed. i98i). A very readable, if not exactly
scholarly, account of the criminal process in the era of private prosecution is C. REMBAR, THE
LAW OF THE LAND 18-35 (1980).
77 See J. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 3-28 (I980). The
practice in the American colonies varied, depending on which European power controlled the
colony. The Dutch colonies that today comprise parts of New York, New Jersey, and Con-
necticut retained the Dutch tradition of public criminal prosecution even after they were taken
over by England. See J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW
YORK (I944). An excellent general background source is Goldstein, History of the Public
Prosecutor, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1286-89 (S. Kadish ed. 1983).
78 An excellent source on the organization of federal prosecution prior to the Civil War,
when prosecutors were brought under the control of the Attorney General, is H. CUMMINGS &
C. MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 8-187 (1937). The district attorneys were initially considered
part-time officers, and Edward Livingston, appointed by President Jefferson as attorney for the
district of New York in i8oi, served simultaneously as mayor of New York and judge of the
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evidence as this might have led the majority to conclude that title VI
of the Ethics in Government Act simply harks back to an earlier
constitutional status quo.
Or the Justices might have reached the opposite conclusion, read-
ing the Constitution, with its carefully crafted system of checks and
balances, as so radical a departure from previous models of govern-
ment that continuity with past practice should not be assumed. These
tiny bites of history, the Court might have said, are not enough to
overcome the plain historical tradition that the President has always
retained effective, ultimate control over criminal prosecution for the
violation of federal law.79 First principles of separation of powers,
the Justices could have argued, hold that if one branch makes the
laws and a second determines guilt or innocence, a third must be
vested with the discretion whether to prosecute or not.80
The point is that whichever route the Justices chose to follow, they
would at least have placed us in history once more, adding to the
constitutional saga with the message: "The political science of the
Founding Generation created a system flexible enough to accommo-
date this necessary device." Or, had the result been different, the
Justices would have been saying: "The establishment of an investigator
and prosecutor outside of the executive branch is inconsistent with
the political science underlying our system of government." In either
case, the opinion would have stood for something important, for a
discovery about the relationship of our world to the world of the
Founders.
Yet despite the years that the Supreme Court has spent building
its de-evolutionary project into fundamental structural law, the project
was suddenly abandoned in Morrison in favor of a balancing test and
a deference to a congressional judgment about necessity. All at once,
the Court is back where many of the critics insisted that it should
have been all along: letting policy, not history, be its guide. The fact
City Court of Common Pleas. See SECOND CIRCUIT HISTORICAL COMM. & FED. BAR COUNCIL,
THE FIRST IOO YEARS (r789-1889): THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 7 (1987).
79 According to my colleague Abe Goldstein, who has done considerable research in this
area, no adequate history of the relationship of the early district attorneys to the executive
branch or the courts has yet been written.
80 On this point, the Court might have quoted what is really hornbook Montesquieu:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same
body of magistrates, there can then be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest
the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical
manner.
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. xi, ch. 6, para. 4, at 151-52 (T. Nugent trans. rev.
ed. 19oo). On the other hand, such a citation might have been embarrassing to a Court that
had just recently decided, in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987),
that the same judge may write an order, command a prosecution for its breach, appoint the
prosecutor, and try the case.
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that the policy is set by the Congress, not the Court, is quite beside
the point; the point is that it is not the policy set by the Founders.
If the reason for the Court's sudden retreat from de-evolution is its
fear of jeopardizing the status of the independent administrative agen-
cies, then perhaps the time has come to subject those agencies to a
bit of the de-evolutionary discipline that the Justices have recently
used to analyze other institutions of government.
I.
In truth, the Ethics in Government Act and the logic underlying
the Supreme Court's decision to sustain it are the natural outgrowths
of a seed of questionable quality planted half a century ago in Hum-
phrey's Executor v. United States.8l There the Justices ruled that the
Congress possesses the authority to constitute agencies beyond the
direction of the President and to imbue these independent agencies
with authority that is partly executive in nature.8 2 This the Congress
can do by directing that specified presidential appointees serve for a
term of years rather than at the pleasure of the President. The Court
has subsequently made clear that it will police the manner of appoint-
ment of the heads of these agencies to guarantee that the Congress'
role is no more substantial than the senatorial confirmation power
specified in article 11,83 and that it will also guard the manner of
removal of the heads of these agencies to ensure that the Congress
can strip them of their commissions only through the device of im-
peachment.8 4 Nevertheless, the policy judgment on whether the agen-
cies should be constituted independent of presidential control is left
entirely to the Congress.
Humphrey's Executor was never an easy case to understand. Did
Mr. Humphrey, the Federal Trade Commissioner whom President
Roosevelt sought to fire, exercise executive authority or not? The
Justices waffled on the point, explaining only that the FTC was not
in the executive branch, and that the agency acted "in part quasi-
legislatively and in part quasi-judicially."85 The constitutional basis
for the delegation (or indeed, the existence) of these "quasi" powers
was not specified, which led Justice Jackson to complain two decades
later: "The mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit with confes-
sion that all recognized classifications have broken down, and 'quasi'
is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use
81 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
82 See id. at 628-29.
83 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 132-37 (976).
84 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (i986).
8s Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 628.
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a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed."86 Humphrey's Executor,
moreover, seemed to fly in the face of Myers v. United States,87 which
was decided just a decade earlier. In Myers, a divided Court had
apparently settled the question of removal in the President's favor.
According to Chief Justice Taft's majority opinion, the President's
discretion to remove executive officials was designed to be plenary,
and the Congress lacks constitutional authority to interfere with it.
Critics of Myers have subsequently complained (with some force) that
Chief Justice Taft played a little fast and loose with constitutional
history.88 But at least the majority discussed the history and language
of the Constitution, which is considerably more than can be said for
the brief and mysterious opinion in Humphrey's Executor.
Like the Court in Humphrey's Executor, the Morrison majority
evidently saw no need to discuss constitutional history in reaching a
conclusion about constitutional structure. In explaining why the Con-
gress possesses constitutional authority to clothe a prosecutor with
some degree of independence - the Justices never said how much -
the majority relied heavily on Humphrey's Executor, treating Myers
as an interesting but no longer useful historical relic. 89 Humphrey's
Executor was plainly a departure from Myers, but the cases have
been harmonized in the past with the explanation that Myers dealt
with a principal officer, not an inferior one, and that in Myers the
officer at issue exercised purely executive authority.90 The majority
in Morrison, however, would have none of this. Myers, according to
the Morrison opinion, turns out not really to have been about the
removal power at all, but about ensuring that the "Congress does not
interfere with the President's exercise of the 'executive power' and his
constitutionally appointed duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."' 91 As a matter of preserving the constitutional system of
balanced and separated powers, it is obviously vital to have some
limits on congressional interference with presidential prerogative, so
the Court's revision of Myers states a sensible rule. It would surely
come as some surprise to the authors of the four opinions in Myers,
86 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
87 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
88 For a particularly painstaking dissent from Chief Justice Taft's reading of the history, see
L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE
LAW V1-56 (1978). See also Sargentich, supra note 32, at 460-64 (arguing that the Myers Court
took for granted the strict separation between legislature and executive, and paid little attention
to the nature of the boundary between the two branches).
89 See io8 S. Ct. at 2616-i9.
90 See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 352-53 (1958) (identifying the functions of the
official as the key); E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 107 (sth ed. 1984)
(arguing that the test is whether the official "exercise[s] the President's own powers").
91 io8 S. Ct. at 2618.
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however, to learn that they were writing about the theoretical standard
to be applied in separation of powers cases rather than arguing, as
they evidently thought, over the precise historical origins and limits
of the removal power.
Having thus disposed of Myers, the Justices rested on Humphrey's
Executor to ground the independent counsel firmly in the tradition of
establishing officers protected from presidential removal. Yet, even
in discussing Humphrey's Executor, the Morrison majority did things
with it that had not been done before. The manner in which the
Court described the key holding of Humphrey's Executor helps explain
why proponents of the independent counsel state with confidence that
it is far too late in the day to question the ability of the Congress to
shield officials undertaking executive functions from executive control:
In Humphrey's Executor, we found it "plain" that the Constitution
did not give the President "illimitable power of removal" over the
officers of independent agencies. Were the President to have the power
to remove FTC commissioners at will, the "coercive influence" of the
removal power would "threate[n] the independence of [the] commis-
sion. "92
If this is what Humphrey's Executor stands for, then there is a sub-
stantial cart-and-horse problem. In the first place, to say that the
Constitution does not grant the President "illimitable power of re-
moval" over the heads of the independent agencies implies that the
Constitution says something about independent agencies. But of
course, it doesn't. The Constitution describes three forms of federal
authority - legislative, executive, and judicial - and sets out in
some detail who shall exercise each. There is no suggestion in the
document, or in its ratification history, that the Congress ought to be
free to create new forms of federal authority and new officials inde-
pendent of the control of any branch. 93
92 Id. at 2617 (citation omitted).
93 At the time of the so-called "Decision of 1789," when the First Congress established the
first three executive departments, there was in the Congress substantial sentiment to place at
least the Treasury Department under the exclusive control of the legislative branch. See J.
HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 30-33 (1953); cf. L. FISHER, PRESIDENT
AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY 86-89 (1972) (arguing that the place of the Treasury
Department was "ambiguous" in the early years of the Republic). To the extent that one is
prepared to accept the deliberations of the First Congress as evincing an original understanding
on constitutional meaning, but see C.V. WOODWARD, RESPONSES OF THE PRESIDENTS TO
CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT, at xiv (1974) (warning of "'golden age' fallacy"), the sentiment to
keep control of the Treasury in the legislative branch might be explained by reference to article
I, which provides: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. The political science of the
Founders attached particular importance to keeping control of the purse in the hands of a
popularly elected legislature. See THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 359 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter
ed. ig6i) ("This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and
[VOL. 102:105
HeinOnline -- 102 Harv. L. Rev.  130 1988-1989
THE SUPREME COURT - COMMENT
And then there is the last part of the quote from Humphrey's
Executor: should the President be able to remove the heads of the
agencies at will, then the agencies will no longer be independent of
executive control. This much is undeniable. What is left undiscussed
in the majority opinion in Morrison is why this makes a difference.
After all, one might reasonably reply that if presidential power to fire
those who exercise executive authority renders it impossible to make
them independent of presidential control, then perhaps the answer is
that all those who exercise executive authority are, as a matter of
constitutional law, subject to presidential control. The independent
agencies, to the extent that they exercise executive authority, would
then be unconstitutional. 94
This is heady stuff, but asking whether the Congress possesses
authority under the Constitution to assign executive functions to non-
executive officials is perfectly logical. The casual reader of Morrison,
aware that this point is never broached, might imagine that the answer
is found in Humphrey's Executor, because that is the case that the
majority discusses at greatest length. But the casual reader would be
wrong. Humphrey's Executor, like Morrison, simply takes the per-
missibility of independence for granted. The sum of the constitutional
reasoning in Humphrey's Executor is the bald assertion that the au-
thority of the Congress to establish an agency of this nature "cannot
well be doubted." 95 The embarrassing truth is that in the long line
of cases since the 193o's discussing the various facets of administrative
government, not one makes a serious effort to justify the independent
agencies in constitutional terms. There is talk of necessity, talk of
chilling, and talk of coercion - in short, talk of policy - but there
is nothing about constitutional structure, or the vision of the Founders.
In short, the Justices have never undertaken a de-evolutionary analysis
of independent administrative government.
effective weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the
people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and
salutary measure.").
94 There is considerable recent literature raising questions about the constitutionality of the
exercise of executive authority by agencies beyond the control of the President. See, e.g., Bruff,
Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 ('979); Carter, The Beast
That Might Not Exist: Some Speculations on the Constitution and the Independent Regulatory
Agencies, in A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT?: THE CONSTITUTION AFTER 200 YEARS, supra note
i, at 76; Miller, supra note ii; Strauss, supra note 32; Note, Incorporation of Independent
Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766 (1985); Olson, Separation of Powers
Principle Is No "Triviality," Legal Times [of Washington], July 21, 1986, at 4, col. '. See
generally A Symposium of Administrative Law - "The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the
Administrative Agencies": Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REv.
295 (r987).
9S See Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S." at 629. For devastating critiques of the reasoning of
Humphrey's Executor, see Miller, cited above in note ii, at 93-94, and Strauss, cited above in
note 32, at 6ix-i6.
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This is probably a poor moment in history to consider whether
half a century of constitutional doctrine ought simply to be discarded.
The de-evolutionary argument against the independent agencies, how-
ever, is not easy to ignore. Justice Scalia, in his heated dissent in
Morrison, dances close to the argument but in the end seems under-
standably reluctant to commit himself to it. The Morrison majority,
Justice Scalia asserts, sweeps Humphrey's Executor "into the dustbin
of repudiated constitutional principles. ''96 This, he says correctly, is
because Humphrey's Executor expressly conditioned the ability of the
Congress to make some agencies independent from presidential control
on the fact that the authority vested in the agency heads is only partly
executive, partaking also of bits of legislative and judicial authority. 97
In Morrison, however, the Court rejected this traditional - if woe-
fully unconvincing - reading of Humphrey's Executor, declaring that
Humphrey's Executor (like Myers) actually stands for the quite differ-
ent proposition that the permissibility of independence rests instead
on the degree of intrusion onto presidential authority.98 Thus, inde-
pendent agencies are constitutionally acceptable as long as they are
not too independent.
This is a contention that Justice Scalia should have met head on,
because balancing tests almost always make for indeterminate consti-
tutional law, and determinacy is nowhere more important than in
setting forth the relative powers of the branches of the federal gov-
ernment. 99 This particular balancing test, moreover, seems particu-
larly shaky. The Court offers no standards for deciding how much
intrusion is too much, and the risk is substantial that the real test is
"we know it when we see it." Given the lengths to which the majority
goes in its unconvincing effort to demonstrate that title VI is relatively
unintrusive, surely a clever executive, jealous of presidential prerog-
ative, ought to prepare an assault on the entire range of administrative
agencies, in effect daring the Court to attempt the same analysis with
respect to such agencies as the Securites and Exchange Commission,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission, or even the Federal Trade
Commission - the very agency that Humphrey's Executor protected
from President Roosevelt's interference. One might imagine that be-
cause Humphrey's Executor is the case that is cited in Morrison as
establishing the test, the result would be the same if the status of the
FTC were relitigated. But there is nothing in the Morrison balancing
test to justify a confident assertion that law rather than habit would
make it so. Certainly the continuing supervisory power of the Presi-
dent over those agencies is less than the thin authority to dismiss or
96 io8 S. Ct. at 2636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97 See id.
98 See I08 S. Ct. at 2618.
99 See supra note 50.
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to choose not to seek an independent counsel that the majority cited
in Morrison as demonstrating sufficient presidential control. So if the
Court really believes that this wildly indeterminate balancing test is
the best explanation of Humphrey's Executor, then what kind of
decision is Humphrey's Executor in the first place?
Justice Scalia leaves little doubt that he considers it a very poor
one. What he may well believe, but would probably feel constrained
not to say, is that, if Humphrey's Executor cannot be justified, the
independent agencies cannot be sustained.' 0 0 It may be difficult to
imagine now, but given the unequivocal language of Myers, President
Roosevelt's argument that he was free to dismiss a commissioner of
the FTC was far from frivolous at the time it was posed. The
Morrison Court's new reading of Humphrey's Executor, however,
strongly implies that the traditional reading of Myers is simply bad
law, 10 ' a point that Justice Scalia could hardly have been expected to
miss. Says Justice Scalia:
One can hardly grieve for the shoddy treatment given today to Hum-
phrey's Executor, which, after all, accorded the same indignity (with
much less justification) to Chief Justice Taft's opinion io years earlier
in Myers - gutting, in six quick pages devoid of textual or historical
precedent for the novel principle it set forth, a carefully researched
and reasoned 7o-page opinion. It is in fact comforting to witness the
reality that he who lives by the ipse dixit dies by the ipse dixit. But
one must grieve for the Constitution.1
0 2
Was Myers in fact the better opinion? Certainly it was better
reasoned. Yet Myers has its critics, and constitutional scholars, la-
boring in the vineyards that the Court has for some reason avoided,
have worked hard to provide the de-evolutionary underpinnings for
independent agencies that the Justices have not.'0 3 It would be nice,
however, if at some point the Court itself would apply its recent de-
evolutionary discipline to this fundamental constitutional question
about modern American government. The answer that the Justices
would find might well be the same as the one offered by Humphrey's
Executor and expanded in Morrison. If judicial review is to retain
100 Justice Scalia, while a judge sitting on the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, was a member of the panel that first struck down the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings act. The court's unanimous per curiam opinion expressed doubts about the validity of
Humphrey's Executor because of that case's approval of the vesting of executive authority in
officials not removable at the President's discretion. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp.
1374, 1398-99 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub. nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (x986).
101 See zo8 S. Ct. at 2618-i9.
102 Id. at 2637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
103 See, e.g., L. FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE
61-84 (2d ed. 1987); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013, 1049-57 (1984).
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its constitutional legitimacy, however, the process of reasoning is more
important than the end result.
Even should a de-evolutionary analysis find no significant consti-
tutional difficulties attaching to the independent agencies, there would
remain the problem of deciding whether, as the Morrison opinion
suggests, the independent counsel is analogous to the independent
agency. The agencies, according to Humphrey's Executor, "cannot in
any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the execu-
tive."10 4 In Morrison, by contrast, the parties characterized the in-
dependent counsel in just that way. To make the counsel fit the
independent agency model, the Justices were forced to lump together
all executive authority as one malleable whole, and to test restrictions
on that authority only for the degree of their intrusiveness. In so
doing, the Court presented the Congress with what Justice Scalia
called "an open invitation ... to experiment.' l05 Indeed, the Mor-
rison invitation offers a Pandora's Box of authority - a box that the
Congress might unwisely choose to pry open.
Already wending its way through the Congress is a proposal for a
special environmental prosecutor to handle those cases too explosive
to leave to politically accountable officials. 10 6 What might be next?
Well, perhaps the Congress, angered by the direction and policies of
the Justice Department under the recently resigned Edwin Meese,
could decree (over the President's likely veto) that the entire Justice
Department is to become an independent agency, like the FTC,
thereby placing all criminal prosecution beyond direct presidential
control. Nor is there any reason to think that the Morrison invitation
is limited to situations involving prosecution. The principal cases cited
by the majority on this point have nothing to do with prosecution as
such, and besides, the Court itself said that the nature of the power
is not the issue. Thus, if the Congress determines that foreign policy
is too important a matter to be left to the politically expedient judg-
ments of the White House, it might command the independence of
the Department of State, to be called perhaps the Foreign Policy
Agency, placing it under the command of a commission of experts
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The De-
partment of Defense, lately scandal-ridden, might be next.
And because the Congress is able to specify not only the tenure of
office of executive employees but also their functions, it may not be
too far-fetched to wonder whether the President - who, after all,
does almost everything through aides - might be stripped of a sub-
stantial part of even his inherent constitutional authority. Just a few
104 295 U.S. at 628.
105 ioS S. Ct. at 2637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106 See What Rehnquist Wrought, Wall St. J., July 6, x988, at 24, cOl I.
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months before handing down Morrison, the same Supreme Court
suggested in Department of the Navy v. Egan10 7 that presidential
authority to determine access to classified information is absolute:
His authority to classify and control access to information bearing on
national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive Branch that will
give the person access to such information flows primarily from this
constitutional investment of power in the President and exists quite
apart from any explicit congressional grant .... This Court has
recognized the Government's "compelling interest" in withholding na-
tional security information from unauthorized persons in the course of
executive business.1
0 8
These are powerful words, but would they really survive a congres-
sional statute commanding the establishment of an independent Fed-
eral Classification Agency to pass on the President's decisions (or
requests) to withhold security clearances from particular executive
branch officials? The problem with the Morrison opinion is that it
provides no reliable guide for answering such questions as this one.
The reader is left with the uneasy sense that there may, in fact, be
no rule at all, and that the principal practical restraint on the Congress
is its own discretion.
The struggling, haunted quality of the majority opinion suggests
that the Justices understood this and worried about it, but saw no
way to escape the slippery slope. And perhaps there is, at this late
date, no escape, for title VI of the Ethics in Government Act really
does grow quite logically from the line of cases permitting the Corigress
to vest executive authority in agencies beyond presidential control.
Perhaps the constitutional assault on the independent counsel was too
late and directed at the wrong target; perhaps, given what has gone
before, there was no way that the Court could have avoided reaching
the decision that it did. In that case, it may be that legislative
government, with a profoundly weaker executive, is indeed what the
future holds, or, at least, that nothing more than the wisdom and
discretion of one-third-plus-one of the members of either House of the
Congress will be available to prevent the legislature from taking us
there. It is a shame that a Court that has lately devoted so much
effort to ensuring a de-evolutionary approach to the distribution of
power refuses to undertake such an approach when the issue is the
independence of executive officers from executive control. It is a
shame because, if government by independent agency is indeed our
future, it would be nice to get there by constitutional amendment
rather than legislative fiat.
107 1o8 S. Ct. 8M8 (1988).
108 Id. at 824.
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IV.
Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act does more than raise
profound constitutional problems that the Court in Morrison, for all
its wriggling, did little to dispel; it also represents a questionable policy
judgment. The idea that an independent counsel is necessary or
desirable for ferreting out and prosecuting wrongdoing within the
executive branch misapprehends the role that the system of checks
and balances prescribes for the legislative branch in checking the
President. It supposes, quite wrongly, that in the absence of criminal
prosecution, malfeasance must go undiscovered and unpunished. The
executive branch cannot be trusted to exercise a sensible discretion in
investigating itself, so the thesis runs, because the President can al-
ways fire prosecutors who get too nosy.
But the thesis doesn't work. Fans of criminal punishment who
want to see every wrongdoer in jail surely have little to fear from a
world without independent counsels. In an age when the mass media
build from every ethically questionable molehill a mountainous be-
trayal of public trust, a serious presidential effort to rein in a prose-
cutor who works in the executive branch is hardly a realistic possi-
bility. American history is littered with the names of disgraced
executive branch functionaries, including some of the most intimate
advisers to the Presidents, who have been indicted and convicted in
the absence of "independent" prosecutors. In fact, the last President
who took it upon himself to determine how far criminal investigations
of his own administration should go was turned out of office within
a year. Ironically, the same Watergate scandal that led to the Ethics
in Government Act has brought about a post-Watergate morality that
arguably makes the Act superfluous. Thus, if the purpose of the Act
is to ensure that executive branch criminality is punished, then the
independent counsel provision is quite possibly unnecessary.
And if, as may well be the case, the principal purpose of the
independent counsel law is to see to it that executive misconduct is
discovered and stopped, its perpetrators thrown into disgrace - if,
in other words, the statute is really about checking and balancing the
executive wrongdoer - then the Congress itself has plenty of power
to do exactly that, and has exercised it often. Under a system of
balanced and separated powers, this is precisely what would be ex-
pected. So what if the executive branch won't prosecute? The Con-
gress has quite an impressive portfolio of powers of its own, and need
not wait for criminal conduct - or rest its judgment on criminal
standards - before meting out its own effective means of punishment
and control. The Congress, for example, may use committee inves-
tigations, backed by subpoena power, to bring to light any malfea-
sance in the executive branch; it may slash the budgets of agencies
not doing their jobs; it may decline to confirm presidential nominees
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for literally hundreds of positions; and, ultimately, it may impeach
executive officials and remove them from office.' 0 9 Beside all of this,
the limited and highly confidential investigation by the independent
counsel pales in significance.
The counsel's purported "independence," moreover, has a darker
side. There is a sense in which the prosecutor is not independent.
The prosecutor is not independent of the will of the Congress. It is
true that the statute makes it difficult - although not impossible -
for the Congress to interfere with the prosecutor's work.11 But that
is not the point. The point is that the work that the prosecutor is
free to do is the work that the Congress desires. The very purpose
of the statute is to remove prosecutorial discretion. The statute in-
structs the prosecutor, nearly in so many words, to bring a prosecution
if the facts show a violation of the law. I" The existence of the statute
almost encourages the prosecutor to find a violation of the law. In
this sense, the independent counsel provision is profoundly unfair to
the subjects of investigation - unfair in that the very prosecutorial
discretion that it is aimed at stripping away should be a principal
check on the oppressive effect of an overly literal enforcement of the
law. As Charles Breitel has written:
If every policeman, every prosecutor, every court, and every post-
sentence agency performed his or its responsibility in strict accordance
with rules of law, precisely and narrowly laid down, the criminal law
would be ordered but intolerable."i 2
Thus the ordinary prosecutor may bring wrongdoers to justice, but
she may also decline to bring charges. The prosecutor might conclude,
109 The tradition in the separation of powers literature has been to dismiss the impeachment
power as a dead letter. Even putting aside the effort to impeach President Nixon, however,
the Congress has at this writing very recently impeached and convicted one federal judge and
has started proceedings against two others. The Congress should certainly make more use of
the impeachment power than it has; it is odd and probably wasteful to confine its application
to rooting out purported corruption in the judicial branch.
110 The statute includes reporting requirements, see 28 U.S.C. § 595(a) (1982), and also
requires the independent counsel to bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any
information that "may constitute grounds for impeachment," id. § 595(c).
M The paradox of this statutory scheme is illustrated by Independent Counsel James
McKay's decision not to indict Attorney General Edwin Meese, but nevertheless to issue a report
stating that Mr. Meese had broken criminal- laws. On the one hand, Mr. McKay was pilloried
for not doing what the statute required; that is, he was attacked for exercising the prosecutorial
discretion that the statute was designed to remove. At the same time, as the administrator of
New York State's Commission on Judicial Conduct later pointed out, only an independent
prosecutor would have dared not to seek an indictment. Had Mr. Meese been investigated
instead by his own staff, they "probably would have had no choice but to seek an indictment
and let a jury decide why Mr. Meese violated Federal laws." Stern, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.
Times, July 29, 1988, at A26, col. 6.
112 Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 427 (ig6o).
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for example, that no crime has been committed. Or the prosecutor
might make the judgment that justice is best served in a particular
case if the defendant goes free. In this way, the prosecutor can help
avoid the consequences of unjust and oppressive enforcement of crim-
inal laws. 113
Unlike a prosecutor in a traditional investigation, the independent
counsel does not begin with an alleged crime and then search for a
culprit; she begins with an alleged criminal and then searches for a
crime. There is no effective executive check on the prosecution de-
cision, because the Attorney General is instructed plainly on the cir-
cumstances in which an independent counsel should be sought, and
the President, as the Court explained in Morrison, can remove the
counsel only for not carrying out the will of the Congress. The checks
and balances are therefore upset: the same branch that makes the
laws in the first place also in effect determines whether and how the
laws ought to be enforced. The sensible check of a second branch's
discretion simply disappears.
It is no answer to say that a third branch, the judiciary, is inter-
posed between the legislature and the executive, and that the Special
Division of that third branch actually makes the decision whether to
appoint a prosecutor or not. The statute doesn't read that way. It
states instead that upon receiving the Attorney General's application,
the Special Division "shall appoint an appropriate independent coun-
sel."11 4 So just as the Attorney General has no discretion under the
statute on whether to seek an independent counsel once the statutory
conditions are met, the judicial branch - independent or not - also
has no discretion.
The principal point is that supporters of the Ethics in Government
Act have apparently forgotten that in the system of checks and bal-
ances, different branches have different roles to play. In effect, the
statute is testimony to a category mistake: the supposition that crim-
inal prosecution has some independent importance in the separation
of powers. It does not. The system of balanced and separated powers
preserves liberty by preventing the concentration of too much author-
ity in a single branch of the government. The powers of each branch
to check the others are plainly established or implied in the Consti-
tution and its history. It is an error to assume that if one power
(here, prosecution) looks particularly attractive, then any branch that
wants it can take it up as a cudgel with which to batter another -
or can force another branch to take up the cudgel and batter itself.
The Constitution grants to each of the three branches an awesome
113 For an analysis of this argument, see Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial
Power, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, X551-52 (1981).
114 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1982).
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array of powers to deploy against the others, and those are the legit-
imate means that each should use in its struggle for equality - or
supremacy.
There is, moreover, a larger problem with the policy underlying
the provision for appointment of an independent counsel. By estab-
lishing and exalting a special process for investigating possible criminal
behavior by presidential functionaries, the statute raises the stakes too
high (and lowers the standard far too much) in policing wrongdoing
in the executive branch. Perhaps Tocqueville was right: Americans
really do not like to think of misbehaving officials as tyrants, and feel
more comfortable if they can instead be labeled criminals."15 It is
difficult, however, to make all executive misbehaviors into crimes.
Yet because the Ethics in Government Act provides for independent
investigation, indictment and prosecution of miscreants among the
President's minions, the focus in considering whether someone has
misbehaved is on the narrow question of whether a crime has been
committed. Members of the Congress constantly demand special pros-
ecutors to look into one mess or another, as though the principal goal
is not to ensure that the executive branch performs with dignity and
propriety but rather to embarrass the President and, with luck, to
throw a few of his cronies into jail.
Against this background, it is small wonder that those who are
investigated by independent counsels refuse to resign, and that those
who are investigated but not indicted - former Attorney General
Meese is only the most recent example - proclaim themselves vin-
dicated. Critics may complain that mere absence of criminal wrong-
doing is too low a threshold for judging the propriety of executive
behavior, and they are surely right, but it is the Congress itself, not
the executive branch, that has effectively established the threshold.
If title VI did not exist, the Congress and the executive would be
thrown back on the old rules, under which public officials were ex-
pected to resign when their improprieties became too great an embar-
rassment to the President - not to stay in office because the congres-
sionally mandated criminal investigation might yet prove them to have
met a significantly lower ethical standard.
Yet it is scarcely surprising that the Congress would make the
category mistake that has led to the bizarre spectacle of executive
employees, not excluding the President, acting as though the only
standard of sound ethical behavior is the absence of criminal indict-
ment. Ever since Watergate, and to some extent before, the Congress
has made a minor obsession of involvement in micro-management of
'is See A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 1os (G. Lawrence trans. i969) ("[The
Americans ... think that oppression and tyranny should be treated like theft, by making
prosecution easier and the penalty lighter.").
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the executive branch. As policy, the independent counsel provision
thus suffers from the same myopia that has driven such ill-conceived
(although possibly constitutional) measures as the War Powers Reso-
lution of 1973116 and such patently unconstitutional efforts as the
legislative veto: the belief that participation in or scrutiny of executive-
branch decisionmaking by extra-constitutional devices or officers will
somehow improve the judgments that are made by the President and
other executive functionaries. Not content to check and balance the
President, as the Constitution and its underlying political theory con-
template, the members of the Congress sometimes appear to want to
exercise a share of the executive power. Supporters of presidential
prerogative, when they consider the range of legislation aimed at
enabling the legislature to participate in executive decisions, rail in
vain about chilling effects and a weakened presidency - in vain
because the Congress is rarely in the mood to listen.
A Congress more interested in implementing policy than in setting
it also runs the risk of exacerbating the very problems it seeks to
resolve. On this point, the words of Justice Jackson may prove pro-
phetic:
I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in
the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its
problems. A crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps
primarily, challenges Congress. If not good law, there was worldly
wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that "The tools belong
to the man who can use them." We may say that power to legislate
for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress
itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers. 117
In the classic vision of separation of powers, and in the structure of
government under the Constitution, policy is set by the legislature and
carried out by the executive. If both the executive and legislative
branches try to implement policy, both will probably end up with a
share. Some evidence for this may be found in the fact that a Supreme
Court with almost the same set of Justices could decide both to strike
down the legislative veto in Chadha and to sustain the independent
116 Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (z973) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ I541-I548
(1982)).
117 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Perhaps, however, not even the Congress can stop the slippage of power from
legislature to executive:
Given their common linkage to the fundamental dynamic of governmental growth, one
might expect any disruptions of the interrelated trends toward congressional decentrali-
zation, an administrative state, and presidential expansion to be temporary. Indeed,
there is strong evidence to suggest that this is true.
West & Cooper, The Rise of Administrative Clearance, in THE PRESIDENCY AND PUBLIC POLICY
MAKING 193 (G. Edwards, S. Shull & N. Thomas eds. 1985).
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counsel in Morrison. But if only the executive tries to set the policy
in the first place, the chances are that the concentration of authority
in the executive branch will continue, not because Presidents are more
ambitious than legislators, but because the ambitions of legislators run
in the wrong direction. The critics will then claim that the executive
is too powerful, and more micro-management legislation will be pro-
posed, once again meeting the wrong crisis.
And so, bit by bit, the Congress may indeed whittle away at the
President's freedom to act. Yet a Congress that would rather partic-
ipate in decisions to commit troops through the War Powers Resolution
than enact a statutory charter that defines the mission for the armed
forces of the United States ought not to profess surprise when the
President defines that mission. A Congress that would rather have
an independent counsel trying desperately to pin criminal charges on
government officials whose ethics are shady than have a clear and
enforceable set of ethical guidelines that lead to a fall from office when
transgressed ought not to profess astonishment when the miscreants
hang stubbornly on, hoping for the vindication of nonindictment. If
the Congress is unwilling to set policies on politically sensitive ques-
tions, it is only natural that the President will do so instead - for
the tools of governance belong to those who will use them.
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